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Abstract
Among the countries of the world, 99.3 % have
been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has
been raging since the end of 2019 and continues today
in 2021. This initially health crisis quickly turned
into a pandemic affecting all possible aspects of a
crisis (humanitarian, economic, social, etc.). In this
article, we are interested in two important aspects
of crisis management: communication / dissemination
of information and preparing populations for risks.
Following interviews with the population, we set
an example of the importance of communicating
information, preparing populations for future crises and
the impact of populations’ behaviors.
1. Introduction
Modern societies are increasingly fragile in the
face of crises. To take the example of flooding,
the observation was made in particular during the
SEQUANA exercise [1] organized in March 2016 by the
police headquarters of the city of Paris. This exercise
of an almost unprecedented scale in France and in
Europe involved several hundred organizations around
the simulation of a major flood of the Seine and the
Marne for two weeks [1]. This exercise made it possible
to compare the consequences of the 1910 flood with
those of a similar flood on the same territory and of
the same magnitude that would occur in our time in
order to draw lessons. A big lesson of this exercise
was to note that the social and economic consequences
of such a flood would be extremely important today.
The proliferation of complex networks, the weakening
of interpersonal and intergenerational solidarity, the lack
of knowledge of populations on their exposure to risk
and their responsibilities in a major crisis situation and
metropolitanization are all factors that weaken societies.
These observations, which were made at the end of
the SEQUANA exercise, can be generalized and are
the subject of numerous studies on the vulnerability of
populations to face crises [2, 3]. Vulnerability is today
at the heart of all studies on risk, as much in the field of
biology or physics as in the human sciences. To return to
the origins of the term, vulnerability in the biochemical
approach refers to the evaluation of potential damage
based on criteria of impact, fragility and exposure to
risk. It is thus distinguished from so-called “social”
approaches which are more focused on the capacity of a
society to anticipate hazards, to cope with emergencies,
to adapt behavior in times of crisis, and to rebuilt itself
[4].
2. Alerts and common causes of their
ineffectiveness during a crisis
In crisis management, actors have various tools
to anticipate and respond to a crisis, including early
warning systems (EWS). The particularity of these tools
is to help in the resolution of crises of different natures,
through the monitoring of hazards by indicators, the risk
assessment, the dissemination of alerts, the definition of
action plans and the preparing individuals, communities,
governments, businesses and other organizations to take
appropriate action in the event of an alert to reduce
the consequences of a major crisis. Thus, EWS are
tools with common characteristics but which can be very
different depending on the nature of the crisis for which
they have been set up. At last, note that a complete and
effective EWS comprises four elements [5]:
• Risk knowledge: knowledge of the relevant
hazard and vulnerability;
• Monitoring and warning service: technical
capacities to constantly monitor hazard
precursors, prediction of potential risks and
warning issue;
• Dissemination and communication:
dissemination of understandable warnings
with prior preparedness information;
• Response capability: knowledge of risks, warning
services plans and appropriate actions for persons
at risk.





In this sequential list, each element has two direct
links and interactions with each of the other elements.
Failure of any part of the system will imply failure of
the whole system. Human factor in particular plays a
significant and transversal role in all steps [6]. Before
and during disasters, people often act according to
their own interpretative schemes which are not always
adapted to risk situations and can lead to dangerous
reactions. Communication technology is a key element
in EWS to improve behaviors, it provides common
pre-disaster knowledge (before disasters), and guidance
to interpret cues during events. The potential influence
of communication can be under exploited, for example,
warnings are often simplified and reduced to a simple
“Red Alert”, instead of providing concrete advice and
guidance [7].
Although the essential properties of warning systems
have been well detailed in the literature and guidelines
for setting up effective systems are widely disseminated,
operating systems still present certain weaknesses today.
• Taking into account the populations is limited:
EWS and/or crisis management systems do
not sufficiently involve the populations in
the different phases of creation, evolution or
activation of the system and do not take sufficient
account the different factors that may affect the
behavior of populations facing a crisis [5]. Certain
so-called community systems go in this direction
but they remain in the minority and localized [8].
• Exercises and underused awareness: Exercises
linked to alerts are not always organized on a
regular basis, and most of the time they are
unsuitable for preparing for the unexpected [9].
Generally organized in a partial way (without
integrating the populations), they are structured
around agreed scenarios and more or less realistic.
Exercises are events that always require a lot of
investment and a challenge for the actors that
some of them fear or even refuse.
• The limits of expertise: Experts have limited
knowledge and rationality, they filter the risk
according to their perception. On the other hand,
the many simulation models that they use in
the work of preparing for a crisis are only an
imperfect representation of reality, calibrated on
the available data, they are often unsuitable for
anticipating rare phenomena [10].
• Delays in the decision-making process: The time
elapsed between the first signals of a crisis and the
moment when the populations are alerted can be
very long in relation to the time available to the
populations to react. Many of the consequences
of the tsunamis, notably the one that occurred
in December 2004 in the Indian Ocean, could
have been avoided if the decisions to alert had
been taken more quickly. Current knowledge now
makes it possible to alert populations in time so
that they can protect themselves from landslides,
floods or tsunamis preceded by earthquakes [11].
• The importance of disinformation (fake news)
conveyed by the media: Information is no longer
the prerogative of traditional media (television,
radio, newspapers). It now uses social networks
a lot. The content of information disseminated on
social networks is differentiated by its immediacy,
its conciseness, and unfortunately the imprecision
or even the propagation of false or erroneous
information (fake news). Associations are
now fighting at the global level so that crisis
communication on social networks is very quickly
associated with information from official sources
or can be deleted by the authorities to put an end to
the dissemination of erroneous information. The
dissemination of information in social networks
and on the Internet is still an issue today. [12]
defines the media as a counter-power which has
the capacity to influence populations in the short
term in their perceptions of risk and their reactions
to the alert but which also has longer-term effects
on this same perception and on the anticipation
of risk by the populations (not to mention the
political and economic consequences which are
not part of this study) [12].
• Lack of adaptation and creativity: Beyond
the definition of well-calibrated procedures and
simulations to prepare for a disaster, [13] insists
on the importance of developing reflexes and
a creative attitude to face a disaster. Very
rare are the cases where the predictions of
rare events have been proven to be correct.
Things never go as planned, and it is often
the domino effects that follow a predicted event
that turn out to be the cause of events with the
most disastrous consequences. This obviously
happened in Fukushima in 2011. The earthquake
of March 11 recorded off the east coast of
Japan caused a tsunami which caused the death
of thousands of people and a power failure
accompanied by damage to the four reactors of
the Fukushima-Daiichi power plant which caused
a series of explosions, contamination of water
and the formation of radioactive clouds. These
consequences in the days which followed the
earthquake had very heavy social, economic and
political consequences in the longer term at a
planetary level.
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3. Crisis management in France
The organization of crisis management in France is
based on the principle of subsidiarity, it is based on
the municipal, departmental and national levels. The
decision to trigger the alert falls within the exercise of
a general administrative police authority, in accordance
with the legal and regulatory provisions in force. The
alert is part of a set of measures to protect populations,
closely linked to crisis management. During a
rescue operation, alerting is one of the responsibilities
associated with the direction of rescue operations
(DOS). It is, except in exceptional cases, exercised by
the Mayor within the framework of his/her powers of
general administrative police or by the Prefect1. The
mayor is the common law authority responsible for
making the decision to trigger the alert, in accordance
with article L.2212-2-2 of the General Code of Local
Authorities. The jurisprudence of the Council of State
specifies the field of intervention of the mayor by
establishing that it falls to the mayor, under his/her
powers of general police, to prepare the crisis situations
likely to arise on the territory of his/her commune, and
in particular to implement the alert and information
measures for the populations (decision of the Council
of State of June 22, 1987). The municipal backup plan
sets the organization necessary for the dissemination
of the alert and safety instructions. The prefect of
department also has competence in the matter which
intervenes in certain cases (danger on the territory of
several communes within the same department, failure
of the mayor, event which exceeds the capacities of
the commune, event of vast scope that justifies him to
take the lead in relief operations). When the prefect
is at the origin of the triggering of the alert, the
mayor can be brought to supplement its diffusion by
all the means/tools at his/her disposal (megaphones,
panels with variable message, diffusion of e-mails, etc).
Finally, at national level, the Prime Minister (Title III
of the Constitution), the Minister of Defence and the
Minister of the Interior (Articles L.1142-1 and L.1142-2
of the Defence Code), have the possibility of deciding
on the triggering of alert measures. In all consistency,
these interventions are generally limited to particularly
serious situations concerning a large geographic area. In
any event, whatever the authority vested with the power
to decide on the alert, the latter is free to choose the
vectors of dissemination of this alert. The obligation
attached to this mission is an obligation of result, not
to resort to particular means/tools.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative divisions of France
3.1. Decision in crisis management
The urgency of a crisis situation means that the
decisions taken to deal with it must be swift and
effective. To respond to this, crisis units are set up
to bring together the relevant stakeholders. Within
a crisis unit, decisions are conditioned by strong
uncertainties, a high number of stakeholders, sometimes
extremely short periods of time to implement actions,
communication problems, and important issues far
exceeding the only immediate operational aspects. The
decisions mainly concern the choice of actions to be
carried out and the resources to be allocated to these
actions. They are regularly reassessed according to
the evolution of the situation, by a new cycle of
questions. An isolated individual is of course not
legitimate to make such decisions, even if his/her
experience and skills are proven. Decisions are taken
collectively, by a multiplicity of stakeholders. Although
in the event of a crisis there is a single manager
designated as the commander of rescue operations
(COS), he/she must interact with interlocutors from
different professional cultures, not always present in
the same place. According to [14], this multiplicity of
stakeholders almost automatically leads to an increase
in the possibility of disagreements and delays, and in
differences in the hierarchy of priorities. [12] also
highlights this difficulty by evoking the growing role
that the media play today thanks to the speed with
which they have access to information. Their new
status as full-fledged actors in the management of the
crisis represents a trial that can be “destabilizing” for
decision-makers. Finally, decisions are not always
consensus.
3.2. French concrete measures for better
integration of populations in crisis
response
The law of August 13, 2004 on the modernization of
civil security encourages actions aimed at empowering
citizens, going against the paradigm of “all protection”
by the state, which, in France, has historically led
to the idea that it was possible to protect populations
from crises absolutely. This law also proposes to
think about the challenges of crisis management in
a comprehensive manner. Risks are no longer only
considered independently of one another in terms of
specific procedures and processes but in a holistic way
in relation to the issues associated with them.
Thus, efforts have been made in terms of institutional
communication, through an overhaul of the alert system
in particular, by the integration of digital tools with an
application dedicated to alerting populations (uploaded
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in June 2016), and through increasingly diversified
communications on institutional sites, but also on social
networks such as Twitter or Facebook more recently.
Efforts have also focused on civil security exercises
which increasingly include the participation of the
populations. For real effectiveness, the consideration of
these issues of resilience must be integrated into each
stage of crisis management, whether during the phase
of prevention, crisis preparation, response, post-crisis
and repair. For each of these stages, specific measures
must be considered, some of which have started to be
implemented in France.
3.3. French EWS
The French SAIP alert system (structured set of tools
allowing the dissemination of a signal or a message by
the authorities) has been the subject of much criticism
for several years [15], it is regularly described as
“obsolete”. The criticisms relate to two major points,
(i) the means/tools of warning on the one hand and (ii)
educating the populations on the risks to which they are
exposed on the other. Concretely, alert has been shown
to be ineffective, leading to misinterpretations of signals,
failures in the coordination of alert actors, a lack of
anticipation or counterproductive or even fatal messages
as it has been the case during storm Xynthia which hit
France in February 2010.
A Senate report, the Voguel report [15] published
in 2017, criticizes precisely the flaws in the current
warning system, and in particular the decision taken
to continue to favor the national alert network (RNA)
considered obsolete; thus involving the renovation of
sirens to the detriment of the development of more
targeted alert means/tools such as cell broadcasting. The
report also calls into question the choices made on the
deployment of a smartphone application which must
be downloaded beforehand by users, which relies on
data transmitted by the internet (unlike cell broadcasting
which relies on geolocation) and which needs to be
open in the background to be able to broadcast alerts.
The application was also abandoned in June 2018 in
favor of communication on social networks and major
communication channels. But the alert system is not
limited to the means/tools of alerting, it also includes
all the knowledge relating to the risks, the means/tools
enabling the monitoring of the indicators concerned, the
action plans and the sensitization of the populations.
However, on this last aspect, the national system is
still considered to be faulty. The French population is
very poorly aware of the risks to which it is subject and
considers itself only weakly involved in the response to
be provided in the face of crises [16]; this despite the
preventive awareness measures implemented through
brochures or information sites. We can also note that
these measures are only partially relayed by the local
and national media. While efforts are made in terms
of institutional communication, on social networks in
particular, the French media make very little reference
to the behavior to be adopted in the event of an alert
or during a crisis. If risk prevention is primarily
the responsibility of the public authorities, it also
underpins the involvement of each citizen to make
prevention policies effective. The accountability of each
is enshrined in the law of August 13, 2004 on the
modernization of civil security. This text encourages
individual commitment to public action which goes
against the classic conceptions of civil security which
are based on on an institutional preventive approach.
In line with SAIP, the state offered the StopCovid
application in order to mitigate the Covid-19 pandemic,
but four months after its launch, only 3% of the
population had downloaded the application. This was
yet another failure of the applications developed by
the state to ensure the safety of citizens. Updated,
the StopCovid application has become TousAntiCovid.
TousAntiCovid is a mobile contact tracing application
deployed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic in
France and initially intended to warn of a possible
transmission with an infected person.
4. Covid-19
The Covid-19 pandemic is a pandemic of an
emerging infectious disease, called coronavirus disease
2019 or Covid-19, caused by the SARS-CoV-2
coronavirus. It appeared on November 16, 2019
in Wuhan, Hubei province (central China), before
spreading around the world. The World Health
Organization (WHO) first alerts the Republic of China
people and its other member states, then declares a state
of public health emergency of international concern
on January 30, 2020. On March 11, 2020, the
Covid-19 epidemic was declared a pandemic by the
WHO, which called for essential protective measures
to prevent the saturation of intensive care services
and to strengthen preventive hygiene (elimination of
physical contact, kisses and handshakes, end of crowds
as well as unnecessary travel, promotion of hand
washing, implementation of quarantine, etc.). To
curb the formation of new sources of contagion and
preserve the reception capacities of their hospitals,
many countries are deciding on containment measures,
closing their borders and canceling sporting and cultural
events. These decisions have economic, social and
environmental consequences and pose uncertainties and
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Figure 1: Barrier gestures - March 2020 (Wash your hands
very regularly; Cough or sneeze into your elbow or into a tissue; Use
a disposable tissue and throw it away; Greet without shaking hands,
stop hugging.).
Figure 2: Barrier gestures - June 2021 (Wash your hands
regularly or use a hydro-alcoholic solution; Cough or sneeze into your
elbow or into a tissue; Use a disposable tissue and throw it away; Wear
a mask when the distance of 1 meter cannot be respected and wherever
it is required; Maintain a distance of at least 1 meter from others; Limit
social contacts as much as possible (6 maximum); Avoid touching
your face; Air the rooms for 10 minutes, 3 times a day; Greet without
shaking hands, stop hugging; Use digital tools (TousAntiCovid).).
fears on the global economy and on the education, health
and fundamental rights of populations.
One of the flagship measures, in addition to the
hygienic and social “barrier gestures” (which evolved
over the course of the crisis - Figures 1 (March 2020)
and 2 (June 2021)), implemented by the French public
authorities is the “lockdown”, i.e. the ban on movement
in France, of the population of March 17, 2020 until
May 11, 2020 (two other lockdowns will follow, one in
October 2020 and the other in April 2021).
5. Communication and Preparedness
In this article, we focus on communicating and
preparing people for a crisis. More specifically,
we are positioning ourselves in the case of the
Covid-19 pandemic which directs us towards emergency
1https://www.gouvernement.fr/info-coronavirus
communication and emergency preparedness (what we
call in this article, “on-the-fly training”). It should
be noted that in crisis management, the concept of
crisis communication is most often used to describe
an organization facing a crisis and the need to
communicate about that crisis to stakeholders and the
public. And (crisis and) emergency risk communication
encompasses the urgency of crisis communication
with the need to communicate risks and benefits
to stakeholders and the public. Emergency risk
communication differs from crisis communication in
that the communicator is perceived as an agent to
resolve the crisis. Each decision must be made
within a narrow time constraint, the decision may
be irreversible, the outcome of the decision may be
uncertain, and the decision may need to be made
with imperfect or incomplete information [17]. While
the concepts of crisis-preparedness refers to the extent
to which the organisation/country is prepared to cope
with immediate and future crisis situations [18] and
emergency preparedness is related to emergencies: a
type of event that produces a range of consequences, and
which requires coordinated action, usually urgent and
often non-routine [19]. There is therefore an intrinsic
link in crisis management between communication and
preparedness. So, how is emergency communication
relevant to emergency preparedness?
6. Population interviews
During the first French lockdown, we tried
to interview the population (especially the French
population) using a questionnaire. The objective of this
study was to obtain, among other things, information
on the reactions of people facing the pandemic. The
120 (“open” and “closed”) questions in this survey were
voluntarily very open to let people express themselves
freely, allow them to reflect on their reactions. The study
was therefore carried out from an anonymous survey
posted online from May 1, 2020 to June 1, 2020. It
was created using Google Form2 for the creation of
online forms and distributed via the Facebook social
network and emails (due to the GDPR3, we have
limited ourselves to our professional mailing lists (many
academics and students) and close contacts).
It should be noted that more and more researchers
are turning to online survey methods to collect data.
The concept of online survey is generally opposed to
more conventional/traditional methods of polling by
mail, telephone or face-to-face. However, there is
no universal definition of what constitutes an online
2https://www.google.fr/intl/en/forms/about/
3General Data Protection Regulation
Page 2405
survey. [20] uses this term to designate surveys where
respondents are not only recruited via Internet but must
also complete an online questionnaire. [21], for its part,
include any survey method involving Internet during
the dissemination, sampling or design of the survey.
Finally, sometimes the conceptual framework can be
ambiguous, as in the case of [22] who defines an
online survey as a survey carried out via a website.
Like traditional surveys, online surveys must recruit
participants. There are two modes of recruitment:
(i) probabilistic, where participants are chosen and
targeted so that the results are generalizable to a wider
population of interest and (ii) non-probabilistic, where
the probability that a individual from a population
of interest belonging to the sample is unknown [20].
In the case of a probabilistic online survey, it is
possible to control the sampling by only distributing
the questionnaire to a closed list of email addresses, or
by recruiting participants by more traditional methods
(phone, face-to-face, etc.) and by providing them
with Internet access if necessary to respond to the
questionnaire [20, 22]. Conversely, during an online
survey with non-probabilistic recruitment, the sampling
is not controlled (e.g. invitations to the survey posted
on platforms and then relayed via social networks
without supervision, etc.). [23] names the latter, which
corresponds to our own survey method, “unrestricted
self-selection survey” (known as “river sampling”). The
use of online survey with non-probabilistic recruitment
has many advantages (e.g. decorrelation of survey costs
from sample size, reduction of collection times and
geographic constraint, etc.) [22] but also disadvantages
(e.g. coverage error linked to the digital divide and
self-selection of respondents). Many studies, including
[24], show that regular users of social networks are
hardly representative of the national population. Thus,
the use of social media as a dissemination platform can
considerably bias the representativeness of a sample of
respondents. However, traditional survey methods also
come up against problems of coverage and exclusion
(e.g. quality of the telephone network, etc.). In all
cases, generalizing to a larger population the results
of studies obtained from a sample of non-probabilistic
respondents requires a precise understanding of the
socio-demographic differentiation operated by these
different coverage filters. However, in the case of
online survey methods using river sampling, these
sources seem to be still poorly understood, making the
results difficult to generalize and vulnerable to possible
misappropriation [20]. To the bias induced by the
exclusion of less connected individuals is added the
self-selection bias originating from a non-probabilistic
recruitment mode. One speaks of self-selection
when respondents choose to participate in a survey
themselves. It is therefore a frequent occurrence in
the survey world, which is not limited to the case of
online surveys. The research carried out on this subject
present certain points of consensus: the self-selected
respondents are more interested in the subject treated
than the rest of the population, feel more concerned,
and are more likely to have strong opinions concerning
the themes of the survey [21, 25]. Unfortunately, if
these trends are commonly identified, many authors
note that it is difficult to correct the biases induced by
uncontrolled voluntary participation [23, 25].
It should be noted that the biases identified in our survey
do not impact the quality/validity of the results but give
some characteristics of the respondents: people involved
who use social media - which is not generalizable.
As part of our online survey with non-probabilistic
recruitment, we collected information on the age,
sex, professional category and place of residence of
the participants, who then answered various questions
relating to the information received, the actions carried
out, the perception of the alerts, the feelings towards
Covid-19, past experiences and their vision of crisis
management.
7. Analysis
A total of 159 people started to respond to the
online survey, 153 answered all questions4. Our analysis
focuses on these 153 respondents. About 57% of the
respondents are between 25 and 50 years old, 34% are
over 50 years old and only 1% are less than 25 years
old. This low participation of those under 25 may
seem unusual since the questionnaire was disseminated
via social networks and emails, but perhaps we can
partly explain it by the fact that the questionnaire was
accessible during the lockdown that the weather was fine
and that they were already spending a lot of time on the
internet (distance learning, ...); Another reason can also
be linked to our “academic” mailing lists. The rest of the
population is fairly well represented. This distribution is
shown in Figure 3. Furthermore, among the 153 people
questioned, 97% reside in France and, as shown in
Figure 3, 74% of respondents hold (at least) a Master’s
degree. The “high” level of education of the respondents
can also be explained by the fact that the questionnaire
was distributed by e-mail from academics. Furthermore,
Figure 3 shows that men and women are almost evenly
distributed (54% of respondents are women) and Figure
4 that all respondents (regardless of age or sex) are
fairly well equipped (95% have a computer and 87% a
smartphone).
4France has approximately 67.06 million inhabitants.
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Figure 3: Distribution of respondents
Figure 4: Respondent’s devices
(a) Date respondents first heard of Covid-19. (b) Severity of the situation.
Figure 5: Knowledge of Covid-19 and severity of the situation.
Figure 6: Places to get information.
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(a) Safety instructions received BEFORE the
pandemic (before January 2020).
(b) Safety instructions received between February
2020 and early March 2020 (before lockdown in
France).
Figure 7: Covid-19 safety instructions received.
Figure 8: Means/Tools of raising awareness of the behaviors to adopt.
(a) Clarity of instructions. (b) Compliance with instructions.
(c) Sufficiency of barrier gestures. (d) Usefulness of barrier gestures. (e) Respect of barrier gestures.
Figure 9: Barrier gestures.
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We are focusing here on a subset of the survey
questions. In particular those related to the
communication/dissemination of information at
the start of a crisis and the preparation of populations
facing a health crisis. We have analysed the answers
to “closed questions” (Yes/No type questions) as a
first step with some descriptive statistics and “open
questions” (Wh-questions) syntactically, using the free
software IRaMuTeQ5.
A first analysis of the terms used in “open” questions
reveals that the respondents used the terms information,
disinformation (fake news), key figures, communication,
barrier gestures, contradictions which show their main
concerns about communication but also about decisions
taken (sometimes difficult to understand/interpret) and
actions/gestures to adopt.
The analysis of the keywords by gender and age of
the respondents6 showed that, whatever the gender or
the age, no keyword is used more than another.
The first cases of Covid-19 patients were detected
in China in November 2019. As shown in Figure 5,
the majority of respondents only heard about it around
December 2019 / January 2020, about 1 month later.
Moreover, around 40% of respondents considered that
the situation was not serious. It should be noted that
most of them were informed by the traditional media
(TV, radio, press) and the Internet. In fact, 80%
of respondents indicate that they know where to find
information relating to the crisis and the majority rely
on government and institutional websites, see Figure 6.
In addition, Figure 7 shows that 84% of respondents
had not received safety instructions before the start of
the pandemic, against 62% around February / March
2020, i.e. around 3 months after the first cases.
The majority of respondents were trained and
informed of the barrier gestures to be adopted by means
of communication at the time of the crisis (TV, Internet,
Press). Only 5% had carried out preparatory exercises
(civil security, for example) in the past and had thus
been initiated into the actions to be adopted in case of
such a crisis, as shown in Figure 8. Finally, 56% find
the safety instructions clear, 62% find them compliant,
41% sufficient, 75% useful and only 79% respect them,
as shown in Figure 9 (respondents over 50 being the
most respectful). These last two figures are to be
compared. In fact, information on the behaviors to adopt
was accessible via many communication channels,
surely giving respondents a perception of clarity and
compliance, surely encouraging a large majority of them
to find the barrier gestures useful and to respect them.
5R interface for Multidimensional Text and Questionnaire
Analysis. http://www.iramuteq.org/
6For the sake of space, all the graphics produced are not exposed
in the article.
8. Discussion
The results of this study are of course specific
to the vision of the Covid-19 pandemic by French
respondents. It appears that whatever the age, sex and
place of residence in France, the expectations/feelings
of the respondents are quite the same. We observe that
they provide first elements to realize the importance of
communication and preparedness of the populations to
better accept, understand and respect the decisions of the
public authorities during a crisis.
Before the pandemic linked to Covid-19, French
respondents thought they were “immune” from a health
crisis on French territory and had, for the most part,
never asked themselves the question of the actions to be
adopted in such circumstances. Unlike other countries,
such as Sweden7, for example, the French have never
received at home or even heard of a booklet / guide on
the actions to be adopted in the event of a crisis or war
(and if such a document exists in France, there is no
large-scale communication).
In fact, during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, a
large part of the French population was not prepared to
face it and the government / institutions had to redouble
their efforts, in particular educational communication
so that the population can cope. The populations have
succeeded in adapting, but better preparation before the
crisis, rather than on-the-fly training would have been
more effective (more appropriate and faster reactions
from the populations and fewer fears, etc.).
In addition, the government’s communication could
thus have focused on other equally important subjects
[26] such as the fight against disinformation (fake news)
[27], a better explanation of key figures (which some
respondents lacked) and, for example, address remote
working/learning issues [28]. Finally, despite numerous
academic and operational works on crisis management
which promote communication and the preparedness of
populations, in reality, on the field, when a crisis occurs,
it is clear that many points can still be improved and that,
more than ever, populations must be included (as much
as possible) in crisis management processes.
9. Conclusion
In this article, we are interested in crisis management
and, in particular, in the emergency communication
and preparedness of the populations. During the first
lockdown in France, we were able to interview a part of
the French population through an online questionnaire.





relating to communication and preparedness made it
possible to highlight the importance of communication
(avoid misinformation, reassure, ...) and preparing
populations in advance of a crisis (avoid on-the-fly
training, misunderstandings, ...). Finally, these are two
areas for improvement to be considered for France.
Among the 120 questions of our survey, we have
analysed here only 18 of them. A complete
analysis will allow us to make some implications
and recommendations (for example, regarding the
actions of decision-makers or community engagement).
Likewise, a comparison and taking a step back from
what has been implemented “elsewhere” would be
beneficial.
Many lines of research are possible on the basis
of our reflection, in particular, on the integration of
feedback on a large scale. Finally, further discussion
should also be conducted on the information to be
disseminated and the means/tools to do so, depending
on the target population or the information to be
transmitted, as well as how to train/prepare populations.
Unfortunately, we are not immune to other large-scale
crises occurring in the future.
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société, Paris: Manitoba Les Belles Lettres, 2015, 2015.
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